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Economic Perspective 2 
SCOTTISH STEEL IN THE POST-THATCHER DECADE 
by Jim Stevens, 
Fraser of Allander Institute, University of Strathclyde 
On 9 November, BS pic indicated their intention of 
closing the Clydesdale Tubeworks at Bellshill, 
Lanarkshire by March 1991. This follows the 
announcement in May that the Hot Strip Mill at 
BS's Ravenscraig works at Motherwell will cease 
production next April. Both these measures were 
not unexpected. In previous Commentaries and 
elsewhere, we have illustrated the financial 
incentive to BS deriving from rationalisation and 
stressed the vulnerability of both these 
operations to the then anticipated slowdown of 
activity projected for 1990-91. Recent events in 
the middle east and the consequent oil price shock 
have contributed to a further deterioration in the 
short-term outlook for steel markets. In 
addition, the prospect of military conflict 
promises to both prolong and deepen the recession 
now confronting the world economy. 
The reaction to these closures has proved furious 
as Scottish politicians, trade unions and 
industrial leaders set out to confront an 
entrenched British Steel. There are few in 
Scotland who do not see BS's current activities as 
part of a phased withdrawal from Scottish 
locations. Indeed, BS have done little or nothing 
to counter such suspicions. In heated meetings 
with Scottish Office Ministers and opposition 
delegations, BS have refused to set out the 
detailed analysis of why they require to close 
these plants. However, perhaps more 
significantly, BS have declined to make any sort 
of clear statement or commitment concerning their 
modern and efficient steelmaking capacity at 
Ravenscraig or their serviced steel making site, 
stockyards and deep water ore terminal at 
Hunterston. 
The political debate seems to be moving in favour 
of the notion of the sale of the Scottish assets 
to another owner. In recent weeks, the Clydesdale 
decision has precipitated such calls and placed 
pressure upon Scottish decision makers to advocate 
the creation of an independent Scottish steel 
industry. Proper reluctance on the part of Mr 
Rifkind, Mr Dewar and the Standing Commission for 
the Defence of the Scottish Steel Industry to rush 
along this path has been criticised in certain 
quarters. The argument is that the Scottish Lobby 
shy away from such a competitive solution because 
all concerned realise that there is no Scottish 
Steel industry worth saving. This may well be 
correct but does not imply that a competitive 
solution at the UK level could not be enforced 
which would provide the basis for the commercial 
survival of BS's Scottish plants. 
The FAI has been aware of this argument since 
before privatisation and had no trouble in 
becoming corporately involved in the preparation 
of the 1987 Arthur Young report for Motherwell 
District Council which called for the setting up 
of a second force in UK flat products. The RSD 
option was placed before the House of Commons in 
the form of an amendment to the Steel Bill and 
rejected by Government. A full analysis of the 
reaction of the DTI and certain Conservative back-
benchers was fully set out in Love and Stevens 
(1988). However, it should be noted that the 
Arthur Young report rejected the facile concept of 
an independent Scottish Steel company. The BS 
Scottish assets were and remain incoherent and, in 
all probability, unsaleable. Any such company 
would lack finishing facilities, final customers, 
a distribution network and key managerial and R & 
D functions. For that reason, Arthur Young 
proposed a UK solution involving the Ravenscraig 
steelmaking and hot strip mill, the Dalzell 
Platemill and the Shotton CR mill and coatings 
complex in North Wales. 
Since Autumn 1989, we have been pressing for a 
wide-ranging and fully resourced study into the 
prospects for the Scottish Steel Industry. In 
July, the then Scottish Secretary, Mr Malcolm 
Rifkind, under pressure from Mr Donald Dewar, 
agreed to ask the SDA to appoint consultants to 
undertake such a review. The discussion which 
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follows provides a personal view of some issues 
relating to bulk steelmaking at Ravenscraig which 
should be addressed by Arthur D Little, the US 
consultants appointed to conduct the SDA's 
assessment. 
Given the difficult short term outlook, it is 
important to consider the evolution of steel 
markets beyond the aftermath of the present oil 
shock. We are reasonably sanguine about the 
future course of world steel production and our 
optimism is grounded on the forecasts of activity 
produced by Mr Peter Marcus, the Senior Vice 
President of Paine Webber/World Steel Dynamics. 
Mr Marcus views the mid 1990s as a period of steel 
shortage conditions due to strong growth out of 
the early 1990s recession. He predicts that many 
producers will face capacity constraints early in 
the projected upturn and that a booming market in 
semi-finished steel products will emerge. 
Developments in process technology are likely to 
become relevant in the 1990s. With reference to 
the publicised difficulties at Nucor, Scottish 
decision makers require further information on 
thin slab casting, its potential and the likely 
timescale for adoption. The likelihood of the 
emergence of direct smelting techniques, and BS's 
lead in the development of such processes should 
be considered. Because BS had been privatised 
with an overhand of steel making and certain types 
of rolling capacity, the incentive to quickly 
adopt new techniques may be absent. The study 
must, inter alia, review the technological 
developments likely to emerge in the 1990s in 
order to clarify if adoption at Scottish sites 
might underpin feasible options for Scottish 
Steel. 
As regards BS's position in Scotland, three 
possible outcomes to the current steel crisis are 
evident. On the basis of our present knowledge, 
the most likely outcome is that Scotland would 
lose its steelmaking capacity at some point in the 
mid to late 1990s. This assessment is based on 
the fact that BS has an effective steel making 
capacity of 17.5 million tpy at its five Heritage 
sites and a potential to double the steelmaking 
throughput at Lackenby by constructing new iron-
making plant. If such bottlenecks were removed by 
investment BS has a potential steelmake of 21 
million tpy. It therefore appeared that BS, as 
they have subsequently confirmed, would move to a 
plant configuration based on 2 major centres ie 
Teeside for long products and South Wales for 
strip and related products. In the long run, both 
the inefficient inland sites at Scunthorpe and 
Motherwell will be deserted although this may take 
15-20 years to complete. The rate at which this 
process will occur depends critically on both the 
evolution of steel demand and the readiness of new 
technological developments in steel making. 
However, contemplating a future for Scotland's 
steel assets either inside or outside BS is not an 
entirely hopeless proposition. 
The consultants require to construct alternative 
visions of how BS could evolve. In essence, this 
involves arguing that BS should contemplate a 
third major steel making centre located in 
Scotland. The rational end point of such a 
strategy involves the siting of new processes at 
the coastal site at Hunterston. However, such 
developments are not likely before the turn of the 
century and that the immediate task is to present 
market based arguments for the continuation of 
steelmaking at the present Scottish sites. BS are 
unlikely to be deflected from closing the 
Ravenscraig HSM because of the poor short-term 
market outlook and because any decision to reverse 
the closure announcement would totally undermine 
Bob Scholey's position as Chairman. However, 
there is little further scope to round out the 
Welsh strip-plants and that if strip demand 
evolved strongly the construction of a thin slab 
caster at Ravenscraig may be justified should this 
technology prove in the way many expect. Labour 
and other markets in South Wales and the East 
Midlands seem set to tighten dramatically across 
the coming decade and Scotland would afford a low 
cost base for steel production. The Ravenscraig 
furnaces, built and rebuilt in the late 1970s, 
require relines and possible rebuilds at some 
point in the late 1990s. The cost of such 
investments may not be as high as either the shop 
stewards or the FAI have previously implied. 
How can the continued existence of a Scottish 
steelmaking capacity best be justified within the 
present strategic orientation of BS? BS seem set 
to become a global player and wish to operate 
finishing capacity in other countries to improve 
market penetration. Although the efforts to date 
have proved somewhat disappointing, such 
developments would result in major calls for semi-
finished feedstock and such demand could be best 
satisfied from BS's efficient UK oxygen furnaces. 
At the time of privatisation BS was the most cost 
effective bulk steel maker in the world. 
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Following the elimination of the EC quota system, 
we expected that BS would make its cost advantage 
tell against less efficient continental 
competitors. BS have been frustrated in this by 
the producer dominated nature of European steel 
distribution channels and imperfections in the 
market for corporate control which has prevented 
BS from purchasing EC finishing and stockholding 
assets on the scale which their profitability 
would allow. Because of the restricted access to 
many EC and North American markets, we have 
consistently supported BS's efforts to buy 
overseas capacity. Those who suggest that BS 
should invest in the UK and export to EC customers 
ignore the realities of the cartelised European 
market or the protected nature of the US steel 
sector. In our view, a successful European 
acquisition and investment programme creates the 
soundest basis for utilising the Ravenscraig steel 
making post 1994. A few adroit purchases could 
transform the prospects for BS's demand for liquid 
steel. Given their past and recent experiences on 
the Continent, we support BS's call for a supra-
national control of EC steel mergers and 
acquisitions to prevent local states and industry 
continuing their attempts to freeze out BS. 
Thus, greater liberalisation of world and European 
markets and consequent strong growth of steel 
trade affords opportunities for BS to utilise 
their Scottish assets as suppliers of feed to a 
global network of finishing capacity. In 
particular, likely medium term developments in 
Eastern Europe should be stressed, along with the 
view that the Scottish capacity could serve these 
markets in one of two distinct ways. First, the 
Scottish plant may be closed and sold to producers 
in capital constrained markets such as Eastern 
Europe or China. Second, BS could become involved 
in developments or joint ventures in Eastern 
Europe in which finishing capacity was supplied 
with feed from present UK sites. 
In terms of a protected European market, a 
sensible case could be made for producing steel 
products at peripheral coastal sites for finishing 
nearer the final markets. This follows because 
all raw material inputs require to be transported 
from other continents and that processing raw 
materials at the periphery presents a strong a 
priori economic and environmental alternative to 
transporting bulk inputs into the centre. In the 
long run, the deep water port at Hunterston and 
its expandable serviced steel making site could 
emerge as a strong and rational focus within BS's 
plans to become a global player. 
Although many in Scottish public life take the 
view that Ravenscraig will close when its major 
internal markets at Dalzell and South Wales dry 
up, the potential for the Motherwell plant to 
operate as a producer of semi-finished goods 
should be fully explored. This advocacy is 
grounded upon the prospect of alternate internal 
markets in the EC, East Europe and North America. 
Thus, this scenario complements BS's known 
strategic approach. To be wholly credible, BS 
should be outlining their new strategy to develop 
overseas internal markets for Ravenscraig and 
considering whether the product base should be 
diversified by the installation of bloom casters. 
These would be needed to feed the long products 
plants recently purchased in Germany and Spain. 
Any strategic appraisal of the Scottish steel 
assets must attempt to build credible futures 
within BS. If BS rejects such solutions the 
argument then turns to whether the BS Scottish 
assets can be sold to new owners. The present 
constellation of Scottish steel capacity is 
incoherent and unsaleable and that an independent 
Scottish steel company is a nonsense concept 
engendered by politicians to support a wider 
ideological vision. The Arthur Young report 
rejected this approach because such an entity 
would lack finishing facilities, final customers, 
a distribution network and key managerial and R & 
D functions. This remains the case. Given this, 
these assets would only be attractive to another 
European or Japanese steel producer with the 
technical, financial and marketing resources 
required to absorb the Scottish steel assets. 
Unfortunately, both the Scottish Office and SRI 
report a cool response to this opportunity in 
European and Oriental board rooms and that the 
advocates of this concept, including the writer, 
require to rethink. 
A competitive solution to the Scottish steel 
question is only coherent at a UK level. The 
Arthur Young report recognised this and advocated 
that the Shotton CR mill and coatings facility in 
North Wales should be linked to Ravenscraig and 
Dalzell to form a rounded saleable unit. If the 
UK government and the DTI were to suddenly favour 
a competitive solution, they would require to 
break up British Steel. 
There is a widely canvassed red herring 
promulgated, inter alia by Mr Ian Lang, that BS is 
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too closely integrated to be split up. It is 
certainly the case that it would be difficult to 
allocate discrete units of rolling mill and 
finishing capacity to each of the demerged 
companies without weakening both. However, the 
Scottish assets could be floated off with claims 
to some proportion of throughput at BS rolling and 
finishing works. In principle, the UK government 
could create a second force in UK bulk steelmaking 
through contractual arrangements similar to the 
basis on which joint ventures are conducted. In 
such arrangements, partners share the costs of 
construction of capacity and share throughput in 
proportion to the capital provided. Thus, a 
Scottish based steel company could obtain 
finishing capacity in this way and thus maintain a 
chosen product profile. The total package would 
also entail the allocation of managerial resources 
to the Scottish company and some share or access 
to the BS distribution network and R & D resource. 
There are variants of this approach which could be 
examined in greater detail and which allow a 
saleable package to be demerged over a period of 
time. The SDA study and the Select Committee on 
Trade and Industry should explore the feasibility 
of demerging BS in this way. 
There are no grounds for believing that Mr Peter 
Lilley is intent on finding any solution to the 
likely run down of Scottish steel and this makes 
matters extremely difficult for the Scottish 
Office. 
In recent Parliamentary debates, Mr Lilley has 
stressed two points. First, that he will not 
attempt to second guess BS's corporate strategy. 
second, that the privatisation of BS as a single 
unit serves the best interests of workers, 
shareholders and the nation. In truth, no one is 
seeking that Mr Lilley second guess BS's corporate 
strategy or anything else. The pressure he is 
currently facing results because he has not taken 
the trouble to assess and explain exactly what 
BS's current strategy actually is and where it 
leaves Scotland and the UK balance of payments. 
Thus, his assertion that the privatisation of BS 
engenders benefits all round seems based on dogma 
rather than a serious reflection upon possible 
alternative solutions. 
Thus, an authoritative appraisal of options is a 
sine qua non if Mr Lang is to make any headway 
with his "crypto-monopolistic" Cabinet colleague. 
This implies that recent calls that the Scottish 
Secretary demand an immediate sell off of Scottish 
steel assets constitutes spectacularly bad advice 
on two clear counts. First, having asked the SDA 
to complete an investigation which is due to 
report on an interim basis in December, the 
Secretary of State would look extremely foolish to 
pre-empt the conclusions of this report and 
advocate a specific course of action. Second, the 
course of action being urged upon Mr Lang is not 
the strongest competitive option. If the 
Government could be persuaded that the competitive 
solution of creating a second force in UK 
steelraaking was optimal, why restrict the options 
to one which is highly likely to fail? The 
competitive arguments which would engender the 
flotation of the Scottish assets would equally 
support arguments to break up British Steel. 
Indeed, to advocate the sale of assets which are 
not likely to be saleable and to argue that this 
constitutes a competitive solution is the 
political economy of Disneyland. 
In conclusion, there is likely to be no uniquely 
Scottish solution to the difficulties facing 
Scottish steel. Only UK solutions exist. This 
appreciation would appear to marginalise anyone 
who seeks to wrap Scottish steel in a threadbare 
tartan shawl. The present exercises being 
conducted by the SDA and Trade and Industry Select 
Committee should have two broad objectives. 
First, to clarify whether BS have any future use 
beyond the mid 1990s for their assets at 
Lanarkshire and Hunterston and to specify policy 
measures which would afford BS greater 
opportunities to acquire overseas market share and 
thus use these facilities to further its global 
strategies. Second, if BS reject such options, to 
establish whether the UK national interest would 
benefit from the creation of a saleable second 
force in UK bulk steel making. If this proves 
likely to be the case, then only the UK Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission could resolve the issue and 
plan and enforce a progressive demerger and thus 
promote a coherent Scottish based steel company. 
It may well be that, following a detailed 
appraisal of the position facing BS, the Scottish 
Steel Lobby may require to learn new lines. 
However, the script should not involve calls to 
sell the Scottish steel assets but rather present 
a clear case for the UK government to break up 
British Steel. Only the UK government has the 
power to make this happen. The question remains 
one of whether, in a post-Thatcherite landscape, 
Scottish politicians can credibly advance such 
arguments and secure a MMC enquiry into the 
86 
possibility of market based solutions. 
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